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Abstract: This paper addresses the impact of violent conflict on social capital, as measured by 
citizen participation in community groups defined for four activity types: governance, social 
service, infrastructure development and risk-sharing. Combining household panel data from 
Indonesia with conflict event information, we find an overall decrease in citizen contributions 
in districts affected by group violence in the early post-Suharto transition period. However, 
participation in communities with a high degree of ethnic polarization is less strongly affected 
and  even  stimulated  for  local  governance  and  risk-sharing  activities.  Moreover,  individual 
engagement appears to be dependent on the involvement of other members from the own ethnic 
group,  which  points  to  emphases  on  bonding  social  networks  in  the  presence  of  violence. 
Finally, in conflict regions, the wealthier households are more likely to engage into cooperative 
and infrastructure improvement activities, while they are dropping from security groups. On the 
contrary,  the  poorest  households  get  more  involved  in  social  service  activities  and  less  in 
infrastructure groups. Our results illustrate the danger of generalizations when dealing with 
violence impact on community activities. We found a large variety of responses depending on 
the  considered  activity and  its  expected  economic  or  social  function.  We  also  found  large 
observed and unobserved individual heterogeneities of the effect of violent conflict on activity 
participation. Once an appropriate nomenclature of activities is used and intensive controls for 
observed  and  unobserved  heterogeneity  are  performed,  we  found  that  some  activities  can 
actually be stimulated by conflict situations. In this respect, the ethnic configuration of society 
seems to be central in understanding this type of social capital building. 
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1. Introduction 
Scholars  and  practitioners  are  increasingly  advocating  bottom-up  development  approaches 
based on active involvement of targeted citizens. Thereby, local groups and networks make a 
difference  especially  in  areas  where  state  and  market  institutions  are  non-existent  or  ill-
functioning. On the one hand, community initiatives can contribute to overcome shortages in 
provision of local public goods and services. On the other hand, in the absence of formal credit 
and insurance markets, networks of mutual assistance allow for productive investments and 
mitigation  of  income  shocks.  However,  well-known  incentive  problems  plague  collective 
action  also  at  the  local  level.  A  large  literature  has  enhanced  our  understanding  of  the 
inefficiencies in local collective action (see Lin and Nugent, 1995, and Banerjee, Yyer and 
Somanathan, 2008, for overviews), although it is still limited.  
Despite the extent of economic researches on collective incentives, this paper addresses an 
issue  that  has  attracted  relatively  little  attention  in  the  literature.  Using  household  and 
community  panel  data  from  Indonesia,  we  study  potential  impacts  of  violence  on  citizen 
participation in  diverse  types  of  community groups.  Looking  at the impact  of violence  on 
community activities will thereby inform us on hidden mechanisms and determinants of local 
collective action in the studied Indonesian context, while general insights may be gained, too. 
It is well known that violent conflict may disrupt markets and economic contracts, in particular 
because it jeopardizes property rights. Micro-level studies find heightened insecurity in conflict 
areas to severly impede the market access of local producers (e.g., Verpoorten, 2009, on cattle 
markets in Rwanda). On a more global scale, the substantial decline in market exchange is 
illustrated by a huge slump in international trade flows in those countries affected by conflict 
(Blomberg  and  Hess,  2006).  It  is  less  known  whether  and  how  violence  would  affect 
community group activities that may play similar roles or complement markets. This is notably 4 
 
important because if such activity can better resist to violence than market institutions, then 
they could replace them in some dramatic contexts. 
Civil wars are likely to severely rupture the social fabric of society. Colleta and Cullen (2000) 
provide case study evidence from Cambodia, Guatemala, Rwanda, and Somalia that illustrate 
how  social  cohesion  and  communal  trust  can  erode  in  societies  plagued  by  civil  war. 
Conclusions on a generally negative effect of violent conflict on social cohesion and political 
participation, however, have been called into question. Using country data for all civil wars 
between 1960 and 1989, Collier (1999) distinguishes war-vulnerable and war-safe activities. In 
a micro-level study, Bellows and Miguel‟s (2009) analysis of the impact of the Sierra Leone 
civil war on post-conflict collective action finds direct victims of war violence to be politically 
and  socially  more  engaged  in  their  communities  than  non-victims.  Specifically,  conflict 
victimization is shown to positively affect participation in community meetings, registration to 
vote, and membership in social groups.
3 However, Bellow and Miguel‟s study is different from 
most of the literature in that they find that neither ethnic nor religious divisions played a central 
role in Sierra Leone conflict. 
Individual engagement is therefore assumed to particularly arise from the personal experience 
of violence, rather than from “merely witnessing” it. This is in line with Blattman (2009), who 
finds abducted ex-combatants in Northern Uganda to show increased political participation 
(measured by: vote, being a community activist, and political employment) after their return. 
The  formerly  abducted,  however,  show  neither  greater  involvement  in  social  and  religious 
groups, nor higher contributions to local public goods.  
The varying and potentially context-dependent nature of the effects of violence exposure on 
social  behavior  is  confirmed  by  laboratory  experiment  evidence  from  Nepal  and  Burundi. 
                                                 
3   In this paper, social groups correspond to women‟s groups, youth groups, and farmer‟s groups (Bellows and 
Miguel, 2009, p. 1149). 5 
 
Using behavioral games, Gilligan, Pascuale and Samii (2010) find greater willingness to invest 
in trust-based transactions and to contribute to public goods in those communities particularly 
affected  by  violence  during  the  Nepalese  civil  war.  Similarly,  Voors  et  al.  (2011)  study 
behavioral changes in post-war Burundi and provide evidence for increased altruism by both 
individuals and communities that experienced violence during the 1993-2005 civil conflict.  
Interestingly, such pro-social behavior in the experiment is found less distinct in war-affected 
communities which are ethnically heterogeneous. In a game-theoretical approach, Choi and 
Bowles (2007) show parochial altruism, i.e. altruistic behavior towards fellow group members 
and hostility towards other groups, to be a dominant evolutionary strategy in the presence of 
inter-group  conflict.  Further  laboratory  experiment  evidence  on  this  “dark  side  of  social 
capital” comes from Bauer, Cassar and Chytilova (2011): In dictator game experiments with 
Georgian children shortly after the 2008 war over Ossetia, war-related experiences are shown 
to sharpen one‟s sense of group identity.  
While within-group ties (“bonding social capital”) may be strengthened in the face of violence, 
cooperation across group boundaries (“bridging social capital”) may be weakened while inter-
group tensions increase. Local fieldwork conducted by Pinchotti and Verwimp (2007) in rural 
Rwanda, also illustrates how social relations across ethnic groups are most likely to collapse in 
the  presence  of  extreme  violence,  while  social  ties  within  the  majority  group  can  be 
strengthened for collective action against the minority group.  
Relatively little is still known about the social consequences of less severe, low intensity forms 
of conflict. For Indonesia, Madden and Barron (2002) document the social impact of sporadic, 
but widespread violence in the province of Lampung after the 1998 fall of the New Order 
regime. They find the presumed mixed effect of spontaneous violence, armed robbery, and 
vigilantism to affect local relations and networks. On the one hand, within-group cooperation is 
raised; on the other hand, social interactions across ethnic groups deteriorate. So far, the link 6 
 
between violence in the immediate post-Suharto era and local social relations has not been 
analyzed quantitatively. Evidence, notably for the country‟s main island of Java, is presented in 
this paper.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the data and 
provides background information on community activities in Indonesia. We then turn to our 
estimation  strategy  in  Section  3.  In  Section  4,  we  discuss  our  empirical  results  from  the 
regression analysis. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Data 
2.1. Community Participation Data 
Local mutual cooperation has a long tradition in Indonesia (Bowen, 1986). The New Order 
regime used to mobilize the underlying ethic (“gotong royong”) of this tradition to impulse 
development  strategies  based  on  collective  solidarity  and  reciprocity.  These  policies  were 
partly a response to rising inequality (Cameron, 2000) and to the lasting impacts of the 1998 
financial  crisis  on  poverty  (Ravallion  and  Lokshin,  2007).  Such  development  initiatives 
became all the more important with the 2001 Decentralization Laws that transferred many 
public and social decisions towards local institutions. These laws fostered the emergence of a 
series of comparable community organizations across the country.  
We study the functioning of these local groups using data from the Indonesian Family Life 
Survey (IFLS), a large-scale, longitudinal household and community survey representative of 
about 83 percent of the Indonesian population (Strauss et al., 2004). Partly using these data 
(IFLS2), Beard (2005, 2007) provides an insightful overview of the Indonesian context in her 
discussion of citizen engagement in local groups. She focuses on time and money spend to the 
benefit of these groups, rather than on mere participation. 7 
 
 
Specifically, we use the second (IFLS2) and the third wave (ILFS3) of the IFLS fielded in 1997 
and  2000,  respectively.  This  allows  us  to  capture  information  contemporary  to  the  1997 
financial crisis and the outbreak of violence in the aftermath of President Suharto resignation in 
May 1998. 
Since  the  conflict  data  we  draw  on  is  not  available  for  those  Indonesian  provinces  with 
negligible levels of communal violence (see Sub-Section 2.2.), the analysis focuses on the main 
island of Java, the islands of West Nusa Tenggara, and the province of South Sulawesi. This 
provides us with a sample of 15,508 adult respondents from 5,026 households, of which 9,466 
individuals  are  observed  in  both  IFLS  rounds.  The  community  survey  additionally  offers 
detailed information on the characteristics of the 197 communities in the sample. An IFLS 
community/village  refers  to  an  enumeration  area  (EA)  that  was  randomly  chosen  from  a 
nationally representative sample frame used in the 1993 SUSENAS survey. Each EA includes 
between  200  and  300  households  (Strauss  et  al.,  2004).  The  fact  that  we  avail  of  a 
representative sample for a large population is important as it is rare in this literature where 
most micro-studies are very concentrated geographically or correspond to non-random small 
laboratory sets of subject. 
Table 1 summarizes the explanatory variables used throughout the paper. In the second IFLS 
wave in 1997, a module on citizen participation was first included. It provides information on 
individual knowledge of and participation in nine different community-level activities. These 
activities  can  be  grouped  into  four  (mutually  non-exclusive)  categories:  local  governance 
organizations,  social  services,  infrastructure  development  initiatives  and  mutual  insurance 
groups.  
The first category of local governance organizations comprises community meetings and the 
women  associations  (Pendidikan  Kesejahteraan  Keluarga,  PKK).  Community  meetings  are 8 
 
held at different local levels and are usually led by an elected local resident. They provide a 
platform to discuss issues relevant to the community and to decide collectively on strategies for 
action. The women associations could be seen as related activities insofar as the wife of the 
Community Meeting leader automatically becomes the head of the PKK. While concerned with 
any  issue  of  local  planning,  the  PKK  deals  in  particular  with  the  organization  of  public 
services,  such  as  informal  education  or  health  counseling,  which  are  provided  by  and  for 
members of the neighborhood. 
The PKK, therefore, is also included in the second category of social services. This category is 
complemented by the mother and child health post organizations (Posyandu) and the so-called 
voluntary  labor  groups.  The  Posyandu  provides  primary  health  care  for  young  children, 
including monthly check-ups, vaccination and nutritional supplements, and trains mothers in 
health  and  parenting  good  practices.  In  return  for  the  service,  participating  mothers  are 
expected to make administrative or financial contributions. Voluntary labor activities include 
aspects  of  both  environmental  development  and  social  services.  The  purpose  of  the  most 
common activity, the “Clean Friday Movement”, is to clean up the village‟s public facilities 
and roads on a regular basis. As the PKK and the Posyandu exclusively address women issues, 
we restrict the sample to female respondents for this category. 
A couple of activities recorded in the IFLS refer to provision of public infrastructure. The 
Kampung  Improvement  Program  (KIP)  started  as  a  slum-upgrading  project  in  Jakarta  and 
Surabaya in 1968. It was subsequently expanded to the national level and provides investments 
in physical infrastructure, such as public facilities, roads, drains and water supply. While the 
focus of KIP is on urban agglomerations, the Kecamatan Development Program (KDP) follows 
a similar approach in poor rural communities. Two further IFLS community activities, the 
provision of systems for drinking water and for garbage disposal, also aim at the developing 9 
 
local infrastructure. Since most of these initiatives are typically considered by Indonesians to 
be „male‟ activities, the sample is restricted to men for this category. 
The two remaining activities share aspects of mutual insurance and mutual protection: Ronda, 
on the one hand, describes informal security systems organized at the neighborhood or even 
street level. Supplementing the police, members of these groups carry out voluntary patrols at 
night  to  enhance  safety  within  the  community.  Cooperatives,  on  the  other  hand,  which 
potentially  comprise  very  different  types  of  cooperation  as  not  further  specified  in  the 
questionnaire, represent the only risk-sharing activity in the survey in a more narrow sense. 
While  we  subsume  these  two activities  under  the  umbrella  of  „mutual  insurance‟,  we  also 
analyse them separately given their distinct economic functions. Table 1 offers an overview of 
the four categories and provides further information on the included activities. 
 
2.2. Conflict Data 
The 1997 Asian financial crisis and the subsequent fall of President Suharto in 1998 were 
accompanied by a period of violent conflict. Aside from the separatist conflict in Aceh and the 
ethno-religious conflicts in the Moluccas and Central Sulawesi, communal violence of different 
intensities  affected  other  parts  of  the  country  as  well  (see  Wilson,  2005,  for  a  national 
overview).  
For the quantitative analysis of these conflicts, we use the United Nations Support Facility for 
Indonesian Recovery (UNSFIR)-II Database, which reports incidents of group violence in 14 
Indonesian provinces for the period 1990-2003. Based on a survey of regional newspapers, 
UNSFIR-II covers “violence perpetrated by a group on another group (as in riots), by a group 
on an individual (as in lynching), by an individual on a group (as in terrorist acts), by the state 
on  a  group,  or  by  a  group  on  organs  or  agencies  of  the  state“  (Varshney,  Panggabean, 10 
 
Tadjoeddin, 2004; p. 7). Hence not included are incidents of “ordinary crime”, such as robbery 
or murder. 
We use conflict deaths as an indicator of severity and aggregate the number of fatalities at 
district  level,  as  in  many  cases  more detailed localization of violence is  not  possible. The 
resulting conflict indices  are then combined with the IFLS data,  which leaves  us  with the 
following six provinces covered by both IFLS and UNSFIR-II: West Java, Central Java, East 
Java, and Jakarta on Java, as well as West Nusa Tenggara and South Sulawesi. These six 
provinces account for more than 60 percent of the total number of conflict incidents reported 
by UNSFIR-II, but were relatively little affected by highly destructive, fatal violence. Table 3 
presents summary statistics for the different conflict indicators that we use in the regression 
analysis. 
 
3. Econometric Approach 
The analysis of the determinants of individual participation is conducted separately for each 
category, as well as for security organizations and cooperatives. The propensity of individual i 
to participate in a certain community activity k in community j and year t is dependent on the 
expected net benefit from involvement, B
*: 
,  (1) 
where  Xit  is  a  vector  of  individual  and  household  characteristics,  Vjt  a  vector  of  village 
characteristics, Rj and Tt are province and time dummies, ai denotes an unobserved individual 
effect, εit is an idiosyncratic error term with mean zero, and β, γ, δ, φ,   represent parameter 
vectors. The main variable of interest is the indicator of conflict, vt-1,d, which measures lagged 
violence at district level. While the expectations on net benefits are unknown, we observe the 11 
 
individual participation choice, which equals 1 (participation) if the expected net benefit is 
positive, and zero (no participation) otherwise: 
.  (2) 
A Random Effects (RE) logit model is applied to estimate (1)-(2). This approach enables us to 
exploit the panel structure of the data and to account for unobserved individual heterogeneity 
that might affect individual engagement. This is potentially important as many participation 
decisions  may  be  grounded  in  permanent  individual  characteristics  beyond  observation 
possibilities, such as personality, family background, past personal events, etc. Thus, we expect 
with such approach to achieve a much stronger determination of the studied phenomena and a 
better control for variable omission bias than in cross-section estimation approaches. Note that 
fixed effect estimation is not possible in our case as it would correspond to many perfect 
participation predictions for individuals observed as not changing their participation choice 
over time. 
The  determinants  of  individual  participation  are  also  estimated  conditionally  on  individual 
knowledge of the activity existence. This may introduce a selection bias in the sense that the 
group of informed respondents may differ from the group of the excluded individuals unaware 
of the activities. However, the restriction on individuals reporting knowledge is informative in 
itself, and helps us focusing on the link between prevalent violence and people‟s decision to 
engage in their community. For robustness and comparison, we also run the analysis on the full 
sample. 
As respondents are asked for their participation in the twelve months prior to the interview, we 
define violence as the number of fatalities in the two-year period one year before the reference 
period  of  the  IFLS  interview.
4  Lagging the conflict variables in that way should mitigate 
                                                 
4   For instance, when the IFLS interview was conducted in December 2000, the conflict indicator covers incidents 
of violence in the period January 1998 - December 1999.  12 
 
concerns of reverse causality from community participation to violence, in particular as an 
observed high volatility of individual participation over time suggests low persistence of citizen 
involvement. We expect this lagging strategy to help much dealing with potential endogeneity 
issues, notably because of the massive rise in general conflict intensity over time which makes 
the most recently observed violence context quite different from the previous ones. Also, there 
is no serious endogeneity issues in violence incidence generating the emergence of security 
groups, for example, since there is almost 100 percent prevalence of all considered activities in 
these data.  
Another potential estimation problem could arise from the fact that victimization could be 
selective  and  correlated  with  activity  participation,  in  particular  because  being  involved  in 
some community activities may make individuals more visible. Further, individuals having 
experienced  violence  may  have  migrated  out  in  large  proportions.  These  questions  can  be 
controlled by examining various subsamples of individuals more or less likely to suffer from 
such selection. We find our results robust to these checks. 
Endogeneity and selection bias issues may be seen as originated from missing variables. These 
issues are attenuated in our study by several elements. First, we introduce province, time and 
individual  dummies  that  much  contribute  to  control  for  unobserved  heterogeneity  of 
individuals and situations that cause endogeneity or selection issues in the estimation. Second, 
we incorporate a very large set of correlates (56 ones) in the regressions, likely to yield much 
more control  than usual. Third, as mentioned above,  we lag the variables  most  suspect  of 
endogeneity. Fourth, a series of alternative sub-samples and conflict coefficients are employed 
to test the robustness of our findings. Fifth, we check that nothing worrying for the estimation 
happens at the aggregate village level in respect to these issues. For example, we find that the 
correlation of violence and out migrations is small and insignificant. 
 13 
 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table  2  describes  the  prevalence  of  organizations  at  village  level  and  the  distribution  of 
individual participation across the sample. Information on the prevalence of these activities is 
gathered  from  two  levels:  an  interview  with  the  village  head  from  the  IFLS  Community-
Facility  Survey  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  reports  on  activity  prevalence  and  individual 
participation from the individual respondents on the other hand.
5 The resulting figures confirm 
an almost universal prevalence of all types of activities in both survey years. The one exception 
are cooperatives, which are absent from 71 percent (1997) and 79 percent (2000) of the 
villages, respectively. 
Conditional on individual knowledge of existing activities, we observe significant differences 
in participation rates across activity categories and over time. In 1997, local governance events, 
social services, and mutual insurance groups are frequented by around 50 percent of those 
individuals  aware  of  their  existence.  Participation  in  activities  related  to  infrastructural 
development is substantially higher, while comparably low participation rates are reported for 
cooperatives. Interestingly enough, we observe a substantial decline in citizen participation 
between 1997 and 2000. Across categories, people appear less willing to engag e in common 
activities  in  the  early  phase  of  the  country‟s  transition.  We  include  a  time  dummy  in  the 
regression analysis to distinguish this general trend in the Post-New Order period, in particular 
from the effect of violent conflict. 
Figure 1 shows the total number of conflict-related fatalities in our sample for the period 1990-
2003. We can see an increase in conflict deaths in 1997, coinciding with the outbreak of the 
Asian financial crisis. The number of fatalities peaks in the first years after President Suharto‟s 
                                                 
5   Additionally, the interview with the head of the women‟s group provides information on the existence of 
cooperatives.  We  therefore  assume  the  prevalence  of  an  activity  when  either  the  village  head  states  the 
existence or when at least one surveyed village member reports participation. 14 
 
fall, before the level of violence tends to decrease again from 2001 onwards. Fatal violence is 
thereby highly locally concentrated: out of the 96 districts in the sample, only 11 districts report 
ten or more deaths from group violence in the years 1998 and 1999, while more than 50 percent 
show no fatalities at all. As a matter of fact, we observe an average of only 1.3 fatalities per 
district once the 1998 May riots in Jakarta are excluded (Table 3).  
Figure 2 depicts the distribution of violence across the regions included in the analysis for the 
period 1998-1999. Aside from the capital city, violence was predominantly observed in the 
western and central parts of Java, while large parts of East Java remained peaceful. The islands 
of West Nusa Tenggara uniformly show low conflict intensities; ten fatalities are reported from 
the  northern  districts  of  South  Sulawesi,  Luwu  und  North  Luwu.  Finally,  Table  4  reports 
descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regression analysis that we now discuss. 
 
4.2. Base Random Effect Logit Regression Results 
We run separate RE logit regressions on individual participation for each activity category
6. 
Our base regression results are presented in Table 5. Coefficient estimates for the individual, 
household, and village level control variables are in line with expectations and previous 
findings from the literature, even if our specification is much richer than what can be found 
elsewhere. The proportion of the total variance of errors that can be attribu ted to unobserved 
individual heterogeneity through individual random effects is substantial. It ranges from 23 % 
to 60 % depending on the considered activity. This suggests that much of the decision 
determinants are originated in unobserved individual char acteristics that are stable over time. 
We observe strong effects for age, gender and the individual‟s position within the household, 
                                                 
6 Beard (2005, 2007) estimates simple logit models of participation with a much reduced set of correlates as 
compared to ours. In particular, there is no violence variable in her specification. Also, as she does not avail of 
panel data, their estimates cannot be controled for unobserved individual heterogeneity, a crucial component of 
individual decisions. Finally, our nomenclature of activities differs. However, we find similar qualitative signs of 
coefficients for several demographic and education variables for general participation. 15 
 
which point to societal role models that encourage or discourage participation in village life. 
Participation  further  requires  a  minimum  level  of  skills,  while  involvement  becomes 
increasingly selective with higher educational attainment. Moreover, participation is obviously 
driven by specific individual needs – likely to be related to occupation, family characteristics, 
or exceptional situations – that can be addressed through different community activities. Recent 
migrants  as  well  as  members  of  ethnic  minorities
7  are thereby less prone to participation 
especially in governance and risk-sharing activities. The economically better off are most likely 
to get involved in local decision -making, while being less present when it comes to the 
improvement of local infrastructure. Finally, we find relatively few village-level effects, which 
are partly absorbed by the highly significant province dummies and individual random effects. 
 
4.3. The Impact of Violence 
We first include in the base specification two dummy variables so as to incorporate the impact 
of prevalent violence on citizen engagement: districts with less than 10 reported fatalities form 
the group of “low intensity conflict” districts, while districts with ten or more fatalities are  
categorized as “high intensity conflict” areas. Other tried separations of districts by violence 
severity  do  not  seem  to  provide  better  quality  evidence.  Such  separation  is  potentially 
important as there may be thresholds of violence under which violence would not affect most 
activities. 
On  the  whole,  the  estimated  conflict  coefficients  show  substantially  lower  individual 
involvement in those districts affected by violence. This significant negative effect of conflict 
on  civic  engagement,  increasingly  intensive  with  conflict  level,  is  found  across  activity 
                                                 
7   Information on individual ethnicity is obtained from IFLS4 (collected in 2007/2008), the share of the three 
main  ethnicities  in  each  village/neighborhood  is  extracted  from  the  IFLS2  community  survey.  As  no 
information on ethnicity is available from IFLS3, we assume stable ethnic composition of villages between 
1997 and 2000.  16 
 
categories, with the exception of participation in cooperatives and risk sharing activities in high 
intensity conflict areas, in which case the effect is insignificant.  
In a next step, we turn to potentially different impacts of violence on community participation 
in ethnical diverse areas. This is important because much of violence in Indonesia is commonly 
associated  with  tensions  across  ethnic  groups.  In  that  case,  local  tensions  might  hamper 
cooperation both among and across ethnic groups. For this purpose, the measure of ethnic 
polarization PQ proposed by Reynal-Querol (2002) is calculated for each community:  
  (3) 
where si is the size of the i-th largest ethnic group in community j. Ranging between 0 and 1, a 
higher value of the PQ index indicates a more ethnically polarized community, with PQ equal 
to 0 for an ethnically homogeneous community and PQ equal to 1 for a community with two 
ethnic groups of the same size. When this measure is included in the regression framework, 
Table  5  shows  an  overall  positive  relationship  between  ethnic  polarization  and  citizen 
engagement across all types of local groups, except security groups. Cooperatives, in particular, 
are more frequented in highly polarized communities. 
In  order to assess the  effect of ethnic polarization on community participation  in conflict-
affected  areas,  we  interact  the  conflict  indices  with  a  dummy  variable  for  high  ethnic 
polarization.
8  Table  6  presents  the  estimated  regression  coefficients  in  that  case  for  the 
polarization  and  conflict  variables.  When  these  interaction  terms  are  added  to  the  base 
regression setup, the negative impact of communal violence on citizen participation is partly 
offset in those conflict -affected communities with a high degree of ethnic polarization. In 
contrast,  the  previously  found  impact  of  violence  on  participation  in  local  governance 
                                                 
8   The high polarization dummy equals 1 if PQ > 0.5, which is the case for 28.5 percent of the villages in our 
sample.  17 
 
organizations and social services is hardly affected in villages with low ethnic polarization. In 
these villages, governance activities are less affected by low intensity violence than before, 
while  still  significantly.  On  the  whole,  the  negative  effect  of  conflict  on  community 
participation  turns  out  to  be  significantly  stronger  in  ethnically  homogeneous  areas.  No 
significant effect of ethnic polarization is observed on citizen engagement in infrastructure 
development projects in conflict areas. 
Conversely,  in  together  high  ethnic  polarization  and  high  violence  areas,  participation  in 
governance activities is stimulated by the prevalence of severe conflict situations. One may 
think that some community meetings and activities are directly motivated by facing conflict 
issues, either in a negotiation spirit, or with views of organizing fighting and security measures 
of some ethnic groups against other ones, or even with mere protection and insurance motives 
within specific ethnic groups. In these areas, still stronger changes fostered by conflict can be 
noted,  starting  from  participation  reduction  up  to  participation  stimulation,  in  the  cases  of 
social  service  activities  and  risk  sharing  activities,  especially  cooperative  activities.  Again, 
reinforcing social network and insurance mechanisms seems to be an important response to 
severe violence at local levels. 
The robustness of those findings is supported by a series of alternative specifications. Table A1 
in  the  Appendix  presents  the  estimated  conflict  coefficients  for  different  sub-samples  and 
conflict definitions. Since the main trends hold when the capital city of Jakarta is excluded and 
when the sample is restricted to the Javanese provinces (Table A1, Panel I and II), it is clear 
that the findings are not entirely driven by a single conflict region. Results are also confirmed 
for a five fatalities threshold from low to high intensity violence and for a continuous indicator 
of the number of fatalities and its squared term (Table A1, Panel III and IV). Further, we repeat 
the analysis for the whole sample, i.e. individuals without knowledge of activity existence are 
included as well (Table A1, Panel V). The results are similar to the estimates from the main 18 
 
regressions and mitigate concerns of sample selection biases. Finally, the use of the Herfindahl 
index of ethnic fragmentation
9 as an alternative way of capturing ethnic diversity results in 
estimates very similar to those obtained with the PQ measure (Table A1, Panel VI). 
We investigate the magnitude of these effects of violence by estimating the probability of 
participation  from  the  fitted  regression  values  for  each  individual  and  category.  Then,  we 
compare the average estimated probabilities in conflict-affected regions to a counterfactual “no 
violence” case.
10 Table 7 provides the results disaggregated for low and high conflict intensity 
areas  and  by  the  degree  of  ethnic  polarization.  We  find  average  participation  to  fall 
substantially  in  the  face  of  group  violence  when  ethnic  polarization  is  low:  the  actual 
participation propensity is up to 15 percentage points lower (social services, security groups) in 
high  conflict  areas  as  compared  to  the  “no  violence”  counterfactual  case.  As  would  be 
expected,  a  smaller,  but  still  major  decline  in  participation  is  observed  in  areas  with  low 
conflict intensity.  
A  different  picture,  however,  emerges  for  ethnically  highly  polarized  conflict  areas. 
Irrespective of conflict intensity, average participation probabilities in polarized communities 
decrease comparably little in the presence of violence. In particular, participation in community 
meetings  appears  hardly  affected.  The  estimates  even  point  to  increasing  involvement  in 
cooperatives in those districts most affected by violence. While communal violence has an 
overall  negative  effect  on  citizen  engagement  at  the  local  level,  the  presence  of  ethnic 
polarization hence seems to spark participation in community groups  too, particularly after 
conflict.  
                                                 
9   The index is constructed as  , where si is the size of the i-th largest ethnic group in the 
community. It is the probability that two randomly drawn individuals belong to different groups. 
10  We use the estimated regression model and impose the assumption of zero violence for all districts to calculate 
counterfactual participation propensities. 19 
 
When such an increased engagement in the local community runs along ethnic lines, bonding 
social  networks  organized  around  ethnic  lines  are  strengthened  and  existing  gaps  between 
ethnic groups are likely to be further widened. To address this dark side of social capital in 
times of violent conflict, we investigate the ethnic composition of communal groups in these 
areas in further details. Namely, an indicator is calculated that measures the engagement of 
members of the own ethnic group relative to the engagement of the other ethnic groups in the 
community. In the absence of complete information on the member structure of local groups, 
this indicator allows us to capture the relative presence of an ethnic group for each village and 
each activity category.
11 We include this indicator of the ethnic structure of local groups as  an 
additional control variable, and further interact the indicator with conflict and high polarization 
variables. 
Table 8 presents the coefficient estimates for all ethnicity and conflict variables included in this 
specification. Similar effects as before are found for v ariables and cross-effects of Table 6, 
which is therefore confirmed. What is new is the role of population shares of own ethnic group 
and relative participation of own ethnic group in the considered activities. These variables both 
positively affect participation in governance and risk sharing activities and less significantly 
social  services  groups.  There  is  no  influence  of  these  newly  introduced  regressors  on 
participation in infrastructure groups. 
Thus, the sheer size of the own ethnic group ,  measured as  a fraction of the total local 
population, has a positive influence on community participation in governance and risk sharing 
activities, while less significantly in social service activities. Moreover, the relative presence of 
the own ethnic group in the  considered activity is found likewise relevant for individual 
                                                 
11  For the indicator, we substract the share of participating respondents in other ethnic groups from the share of 
participants in the respondent‟s own ethnic group. Ranging between -1 and 1, a higher value indicates larger 
relative involvement of the own ethnic group (the indicator equals 1 if all members of the own ethnicity and no 
member  of  other  ethnic  groups  report  participation,  and  -1  vice  versa).  To  avoid  obvious  concerns  of 
endogeneity, we exclude the respondent‟s own observation from the calculation of participation shares. 20 
 
engagement in local governance and risk-sharing activities. Cooperatives, in particular, appear 
to be mostly organized within ethnic boundaries. 
When focusing on high polarization and high relative participation areas for each activity, and 
separating low and high conflict situations, we find that participation in governance activities 
and social services increases substantially with the relative share of participants from the own 
ethnicity in high conflict areas. Put differently, the willingness to get involved in certain local 
groups  decreases  with  the  relative  engagement  of  people  from  other  ethnic  groups.  The 
presence of severe violence hence seems to strengthen bonding networks and to sharpen local 
divisions along ethnic lines. This finding holds not only for highly polarized regions, but is 
found similarly for high conflict regions with lower levels of ethnic polarization when focusing 
on governance activities (Table A2).  
Finally, we turn to individual characteristics other than ethnicity that might affect engagement 
in one‟s community in the presence of violence. Similarly to above, we interact the conflict 
variables  with  a  few  socio-economic  variables  of  interest:  individual  education,  age,  and 
household wealth. Table 9 reports some selected results. While no specific conflict effects for 
individual‟s without primary education are found (results not shown), respondents with at least 
secondary education show a high propensity to join local cooperatives in high intensity conflict 
areas (Table 9, Panel I). The well educated hence may use this form of mutual insurance to 
protect themselves against the insecurities inherent to violent conflict. They may also take a 
leading  organizing  position  in  these  groups  likely  to  shield  members  from  some  negative 
consequences of conflict. 
Panel II and III of Table 9 illustrate the effects of violent conflict on community participation 
of  poor  and  wealthy  households,  respectively.  Poor  households,  as  defined  by  asset  levels 
below the first quartile, tend to withdraw from infrastructure development projects, which may 
be perceived as a minor priority in conflict times. However, a comparably higher participation 21 
 
of the poor is observed for social services, which most likely offer needed assistance. The well 
off, with assets above the third quartile, on the other hand, seem either to seek for protection 
through participation in cooperatives and infrastructure groups, or to accept responsibilities 
within these organizations to help responding to the violence context. Finally, their drop out of 
neighborhood security organizations might be explained by increasing risks of engagement and 
a greater ability to employ private measures of protection.  
Clearly, the estimated effects of context, ethnic group, education, wealth variables – interacted 
or not with conflict indicators – raise interpretation difficulties. We have suggested several 
ones based on individual or collective motives, in particular protection and insurance strategies, 
or social roles. However, another possibility is that of group capture of some of these activities. 
These groups could be some ethnic communities specialized in specific activities related to 
their economic or political background. They may also be social classes better positioned to 




This paper analyzes how community activities at local levels are affected by the presence of 
low-intensive forms of violent conflict. Using micro-level and conflict event data from the 
Indonesian transition at the turn of the millennium, we find an overall negative effect of violent 
conflict on social relations. Citizen participation decreases substantially in areas affected by 
group violence in the early years of the post-Suharto transition. This is true for different types 
of local groups, ranging from local governance to social services and risk-sharing activities.  
However, a different phenomenon takes place in conflict regions with high ethnic polarization. 
In  communities  with  more  than  one  large  ethnic  group,  local  involvement  in  community 22 
 
activities is far less impacted by conflict than in ethnically homogeneous environments. There 
is  even  rising  participation  in  risk-sharing  activities,  which  can  be  seen  as  a  response  to 
violence. The individual engagement is stimulated by the relative presence of the own ethnic 
group in each community activity and discouraged by participation from other ethnic groups. 
Social divisions are hence likely to worsen in times of violence. Beyond ethnic identity, in 
situation  of  severe  conflict  the  better-off  and  the  well  educated  are  found  to  get  further 
involved in local risk-sharing initiatives, while dropping out of other common groups. Local 
social networks therefore appear to be threatened by the presence of violent conflict, with a 
greater risk of exclusion for ethnic, social or economic minorities.  
Our results go beyond identifying key determinants of local community activities in Indonesia. 
They elicit general insights about how to think about activity participation in violent conflict 
context. Notably, they show the danger of generalizations when dealing with violence impact 
on activity. The question to ask about this is: what type of activity? Indeed, beyond some 
general depressing effect of violence, we found a large variety of responses depending on the 
considered activity and its expected economic or social function. This raises the need for better 
and more accurate definitions of „violence effects‟ in the literature, starting with the type of 
violence and the type of considered activity. Moreover, we find evidence of interactions of the 
social structure of society with violence variables, in particular for ethnic, education and wealth 
dimensions. Therefore, rather than studying pure „violence effects‟ one should perhaps rather 
investigate more closely the social mechanisms through which violence operates and through 
which people respond to violence.  
Finally, we found large individual heterogeneity of the effect of violent conflict on activity 
participation,  with  both  observed  and  unobserved  components  of  this  heterogeneity  being 
substantial in our estimates. This suggests paying attention to distributions of conflict impacts 
rather than just global effects that may miss some essential features of the studied phenomena.  23 
 
In particular, depending on the situations, different ethnic groups and different social classes 
are found to suffer and to respond differently to conflict situations in our data. This occurrence 
of ethnic variables raises additional questions, as in Kanbur et al. (2009). In the long term, 
ethnicity is the product of a certain kind of group dynamics. If violence strengthens group 
divisions, it may be at the origin of new social groups. In this view, participation in community 
activities  may  be  a  preliminary  stage  in  the  constitution  of  future  groups,  illustrating  the 
complex  interactions  of  economic  and  ethnic  solidarities  in  society
12. An  extreme,  while 
possible, interaction case is the group capture of some community activity, a process perhaps 
partly in progress in Indonesia. 
What has been learned on the functioning of community activities by looking at how violent 
conflict impact them? First and foremost, we found that local community activities are not 
immune to violence and cannot constitute by themselves a sufficient safety net when market 
and state institutions are disrupted by conflict. We also learned that they are broad classes of 
activities that seem to differ in their social and economic responses to a given type of risk, and 
perhaps to all risks. Establishing a reasoned nomenclature of these activities is clearly a task 
necessary to avoid confusing generalizations, and we made a step in this direction.  
Another  valuable  finding  is  that  observed  and  unobserved  heterogeneities  are  crucial  in 
understanding participation in community activities, and that controlling for heterogeneity has 
diverse  and  distinct  effect  on  different  activities.  Then,  once  these  analytical  tasks  are 
performed, it is easier to distinguish, as we found in Indonesia, that some activities can actually 
be stimulated by conflict situations, probably because they are part of the response mechanisms 
to these shocks. 
                                                 
12 Dasgupta and Kanbur (2007) investigate theoretically how community and class divisions 
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Table 1: Overview of Community Organizations 







Community Meeting  
Including Village Advisory 
Board activities 
Pertemuan Masyarakat 
Community meetings are organized at various levels. The RT 
(Rukun Tetangga, neighborhood) is the lowest tier of governmental 
hierarchy and comprises about 20-50 households. The neighborhood 
association is supposed to manage various community matters, and 





The  Women‟s  Family  Welfare  Organization  (PKK)  was  first 
promoted in 1972 as a national organization. The PKK is organized 
at  all  administrative  tiers,  from  the  neighborhood  to  the  national 





Community Weighing Post 
Posyandu 
The  integrated  community  health  post  (Posyandu)  is  run  by 
volunteers and provides preventative health care for young children. 
There  are  over  200,000  Posyandu  spread  out  in  urban  and  rural 
areas, in general supported by sub-district health centers and their 
trained staff.  
Voluntary Labor  
(Jumat Bersih) 
Jumat Bersih (“Clean Friday Movement”) is intended to promote 
healthy living behavior with emphasis on personal, domestic and 





Program to Improve the 
Village/Neighborhood 
Street improvement, public 
facilities 
Program Perbaikan Kampung  
(KIP, MHT, Konblokisasi) 
The Kampung Improvement Program (KIP) mainly addresses the 
housing problems of low- and middle-income households. Typical 
activities include the building or renovation of school and health 
facilities, the improvement of the living space (lighting, footpaths), 
or the reduction of housing density. MHT is a part of the nation-
wide KIP program. 
System for Drinking Water 
Sistem mengelola air untuk 
minum 
Activities  aimed  at  the  improvement  of  the  neighborhood 
infrastructure, such as the installation of a public pump system or 
the construction of public washing areas (MCK, referring to bath, 
wash, toilet).  
System for Garbage 
Disposal 
Sistem mengelola sampah 
padat  





Ronda, neighborhood watches, have a long tradition especially on 
Java. This non-paid community service is provided by volunteers 
and typically organized at the neighborhood or street level. 
Siskamling describes private security units whose guards might 
receive a small salary and also protect public or business facilities. 
Cooperatives 
Includes all types and levels of 
cooperatives 
Kooperasi 
Cooperatives encompass a wide range of potential organizations. In 
general,  a  cooperative  is  intended  to  pool  resources and  to  share 
risks  among  a  group  of  actors  with  similar  economic  or  socials 




Table 2: Prevalence of Activities and Individual Participation Rates 
Category 
Prevalence of Activities (%)  Individual Participation 
1997  2000 
1997  2000 
Obs.
 *  Share PA
**  Obs.  Share PA 
Local Governance  99.5  100.0  5,675  48.2  7,607  30.2 
Social Services
***  100.0  100.0  4,257  52.3  5,244  34.7 
Infrastructure Development
****  96.5  96.5  1,795  77.8  1,979  59.6 
Mutual Insurance  100.0  98.5  2,883  57.8  3,585  26.6 
Neighborhood Security Groups  98.5  96.5  2,012  73.5  1,197  54.8 
Cooperatives  70.5  79.4  1,066  23.1  2,412  13.6 
*   Conditional on the Individual Knowledge of the Existence of Activities.  
**  Participation (PA) equals “1” if engaged in at least one of the activities in a category. Participation is “0” when the respondent is 
not participating, but aware of at least one of the activities in a given category.  
*** Females only. 
**** Males only. 
 
Table 3: Conflict Indicators – Summary Statistics 
Variable  n  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
            Whole Sample 
Violence at District level: Number of Fatalities  192  7.8  39.7  0  263 
Violence at District level: No fatalities (Dummy)  192  0.625  0.485  0  1 
Violence at District level: ≥ 5 fatalities (Dummy)  192  0.089  0.285  0  1 
Violence at District level: ≥ 10 fatalities (Dummy)  192  0.057  0.233  0  1 
  Whole Sample – Jakarta Excluded 
Violence at District level: Number of Fatalities  182  1.3  4.3  0  40 
Violence at District level: No fatalities (Dummy)  182  0.648  0.479  0  1 
Violence at District level: ≥ 5 fatalities (Dummy)  182  0.060  0.239  0  1 
Violence at District level: ≥ 10 fatalities (Dummy)  182  0.033  0.179  0  1 
  Java Only 
Violence at District level: Number of Fatalities  154  9.5  44.2  0  263 
Violence at District level: No fatalities (Dummy)  154  0.617  0.488  0  1 
Violence at District level: ≥ 5 fatalities (Dummy)  154  0.097  0.297  0  1 




Table 4: Descriptive Statistics  
Variable  n  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
            Individual Characteristics 
Age  24974  37.5  16.7  14  111 
Sex (1: Male)  24974  0.462  0.499  0  1 
No education  24974  0.154  0.361  0  1 
Primary education  24974  0.444  0.497  0  1 
Junior high school  24974  0.153  0.360  0  1 
Senior high school  24974  0.195  0.396  0  1 
Higher education  24974  0.054  0.227  0  1 
Employment: private worker  24972  0.253  0.434  0  1 
Employment: self-employed  24972  0.265  0.441  0  1 
Employment: unpaid family worker  24972  0.083  0.276  0  1 
Employment: government worker  24972  0.039  0.195  0  1 
Hours normally worked per week  24974  28.2  27.9  0  112 
Monthly income (in 1,000 Rp.,
a 2000 Prices)  24973  235.3  717.6  0  30,000 
Married  24974  0.643  0.479  0  1 
Household head or spouse  24974  0.602  0.489  0  1 
Dummy: Seriousness of the respondent not excellent or good  24974  0.223  0.416  0  1 
  Household Characteristics 
Age household head  9002  47.6  14.5  15  111 
Household consumption (adult equivalent, in 1,000 Rp., 2000 Prices)  8507  215.4  282.2  3.5  6,526.3 
Household asset value, relative rank in the community  9002  0.522  0.289  0.022  1 
Household with farm production  9002  0.349  0.477  0  1 
Household with Income from Non-farm Business  9002  0.349  0.494  0  1 
Female headed household  9002  0.179  0.381  0  1 
Number of household adults  9002  4.0  2.0  1  20 
Experience of a shock (natural disaster)  9002  0.281  0.449  0  1 
Household has moved to this community in the last 2 years  9002  0.014  0.117  0  1 
Household owns a television  9002  0.539  0.499  0  1 
  Community Characteristics & Province Dummies 
Rural  394  0.389  0.487  0  1 
Total population  394  12,867  19,587  825  236,500 
Average HH asset value in the village (in Mio. Rp.)  394  71.4  102.3  5.7  1,079.18 
Within-village Gini index of asset inequality  394  0.530  0.123  0.171  0.885 
Within-village Gini index of consumption inequality  378  0.222  0.240  0  0.82 
Index of ethnic fractionalization
 b  394  0.175  0.381  0  1 
Province dummy: Jakarta  394  0.259  0.439  0  1 
Province dummy: Jawa Barat  394  0.183  0.387  0  1 
Province dummy: Jawa Tengah  394  0.226  0.419  0  1 
Province dummy: Jawa Timur  394  0.081  0.274  0  1 
Province dummy: Nusa Tenggara Barat  394  0.076  0.266  0  1 
Province dummy: Sulawesi Selatan  394  0.389  0.487  0  1 
a  Exchange rate in 2000: 1 US-$ ~ 3,000 IDR  








Table 5: Base Random Effect Logit Regression Results 
DV: Participation 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Governance  Social Service  Infrastructure  Risk-Sharing  Security  Cooperatives 
 
Individual Characteristics 
Age Group: 25-39 Years
a 
0.55***  0.27***  0.31*  1.02***  0.98***  1.57*** 
(0.000)  (0.009)  (0.052)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Age Group: 40-65 Years 
0.73***  -0.29**  0.49*  1.25***  0.83**  2.34*** 
(0.000)  (0.023)  (0.066)  (0.000)  (0.010)  (0.000) 
Age Group: >65 Years 
0.53**  -0.48*  0.44  0.63*  -0.45  2.09** 
(0.029)  (0.052)  (0.273)  (0.083)  (0.339)  (0.010) 
Male 
1.71***      2.19***    -0.31 
(0.000)      (0.000)    (0.122) 
No education
b 
-0.84***  -0.67***  -0.18  -0.45***  -0.54**  -0.98** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.348)  (0.008)  (0.013)  (0.027) 
Junior High School 
0.31***  0.24**  -0.20  -0.08  -0.34**  0.40 
(0.001)  (0.019)  (0.123)  (0.518)  (0.039)  (0.129) 
Senior High School  
0.47***  0.24**  -0.13  0.05  -0.37**  0.95*** 
(0.000)  (0.027)  (0.331)  (0.684)  (0.025)  (0.000) 
Higher Education 
0.51***  0.05  -0.03  0.21  -0.18  1.21*** 
(0.001)  (0.793)  (0.895)  (0.298)  (0.526)  (0.003) 
Job Category: Private Worker
c 
0.16  0.11  0.74***  0.75***  0.97***  0.88** 
(0.295)  (0.502)  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.047) 
Job Category: Self-Employed 
0.31**  0.34**  0.80***  0.56***  0.74**  0.60 
(0.034)  (0.040)  (0.001)  (0.007)  (0.011)  (0.160) 
Job Category: Unpaid Family 
Worker 
0.04  0.05  0.75***  0.15  0.02  -0.07 
(0.729)  (0.702)  (0.001)  (0.450)  (0.948)  (0.865) 
Job Category: Government  
0.72***  0.80***  1.03***  1.28***  1.19***  2.25*** 
(0.001)  (0.004)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Hours worked per week 
-0.01  -0.07***  -0.03  0.03  0.03  0.00 
(0.695)  (0.000)  (0.183)  (0.161)  (0.238)  (0.972) 
Total monthly income (ln) 
0.01  -0.02  0.01  -0.01  -0.02  -0.02 
(0.465)  (0.151)  (0.453)  (0.246)  (0.159)  (0.388) 
Married 
0.77***  1.89***  0.23  0.25*  0.48**  0.30 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.182)  (0.087)  (0.016)  (0.342) 
Head or Spouse of Head 
0.71***  0.09  0.12  0.33*  0.58**  0.76** 
(0.000)  (0.411)  (0.617)  (0.085)  (0.041)  (0.041) 
Population Share of one‟s own 
Ethnicity in the Village 
0.63***  0.42**  0.38  0.66***  0.49*  0.84 
(0.001)  (0.028)  (0.107)  (0.005)  (0.098)  (0.120) 
Seriousness of Answers:  
not excellent or good 
-0.05  -0.14*  -0.25**  0.04  0.04  0.19 
(0.544)  (0.068)  (0.020)  (0.725)  (0.776)  (0.388) 
Household Characteristics 
Age HH Head: 40-65 Years
a 
0.11  -0.47***  -0.31  -0.17  0.05  -0.34 
(0.258)  (0.000)  (0.130)  (0.288)  (0.843)  (0.238) 
Age HH Head: >65 Years 
0.07  -0.66***  -0.33  -0.33  0.03  -0.90* 
(0.637)  (0.000)  (0.224)  (0.156)  (0.924)  (0.064) 




-0.26***  -0.04  -0.01  -0.02  -0.12  -0.16 
(0.001)  (0.556)  (0.964)  (0.811)  (0.392)  (0.494) 
Household Expenditure –  
4
th Quantile 
0.37***  0.01  -0.25**  0.08  0.08  -0.00 
(0.000)  (0.954)  (0.036)  (0.466)  (0.620)  (0.989) 
Relative Wealth: Asset Value 
Rank within Village 
0.55  -0.04  -0.75  0.97  1.81**  1.00 
(0.231)  (0.929)  (0.307)  (0.147)  (0.046)  (0.480) 
Household with Farm Income 
0.06  -0.17**  0.36***  0.25**  0.24*  0.29 
(0.415)  (0.033)  (0.003)  (0.019)  (0.100)  (0.184) 
Household with Income from 
Non-farm Business 
0.03  0.00  0.12  -0.02  0.05  0.21 
(0.683)  (0.984)  (0.198)  (0.800)  (0.656)  (0.275) 
Female Household Head 
0.26**  0.71***  0.57***  -0.02  0.19  0.17 
(0.012)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.913)  (0.377)  (0.589) 
HH Adults 
0.01  0.05***  -0.02  -0.03*  -0.01  -0.03 
(0.647)  (0.000)  (0.252)  (0.064)  (0.598)  (0.422) 
Recent Economic Hardship  
(Crop, Job or Income Loss) 
0.15**  0.16**  0.16  0.10  0.12  0.18 
(0.019)  (0.018)  (0.101)  (0.245)  (0.314)  (0.316) 
Household migrated in the last 
two yrs to this community 
-1.70***  -0.10  -0.09  -1.15**  -0.82  -1.36 
(0.000)  (0.749)  (0.830)  (0.013)  (0.144)  (0.159) 30 
 
 




0.02  -0.00  0.32**  0.03  -0.28*  0.48* 
(0.788)  (0.965)  (0.013)  (0.802)  (0.069)  (0.055) 
Population Size 
-0.01  -0.02  0.03  0.04  0.02  0.03 
(0.505)  (0.273)  (0.428)  (0.134)  (0.634)  (0.523) 
Average HH Asset Value 
0.12**  -0.02  -0.18**  0.05  -0.09  -0.22 
(0.026)  (0.738)  (0.021)  (0.469)  (0.312)  (0.186) 
Within-Village Gini Index of 
Asset Inequality 
-0.52  0.64  -0.98  0.60  1.78*  -1.25 
(0.368)  (0.272)  (0.265)  (0.458)  (0.096)  (0.474) 
IA: Asset Gini x  
Relative HH Wealth 
-0.23  -0.22  1.49  -1.96  -3.34**  -0.77 
(0.794)  (0.802)  (0.263)  (0.111)  (0.044)  (0.767) 
Index of Ethnic Polarization 
0.66***  0.68***  0.39*  0.82***  0.10  1.74*** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.065)  (0.000)  (0.663)  (0.000) 
Conflict Coefficients 
Low Intensity: 1-9 Fatalities 
-0.43***  -0.42***  -0.27**  -0.31***  -0.24*  -0.47** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.010)  (0.001)  (0.058)  (0.026) 
High Intensity: ≥ 10 Fatalities 
-0.51***  -0.58***  -0.44**  -0.02  -0.51**  0.36 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.019)  (0.886)  (0.036)  (0.266) 
Province and Timme Dummies 
Jakarta
e 
-0.83***  -0.96***  -0.67***  -0.14  0.39  -1.94*** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.003)  (0.492)  (0.174)  (0.000) 
West Java 
-0.81***  -0.59***  -0.10  0.23*  -0.25  -0.55** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.461)  (0.075)  (0.189)  (0.043) 
East Java 
-0.27***  -0.66***  -0.58***  0.03  -0.33*  -0.16 
(0.003)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.831)  (0.098)  (0.540) 
Nusa Tenggara Barat 
-0.41***  0.49***  0.31  0.45**  0.14  -0.17 
(0.001)  (0.000)  (0.130)  (0.011)  (0.573)  (0.656) 
South Sulawesi 
-0.97***  -1.02***  -1.15***  0.56***  -0.22  -0.69 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.006)  (0.375)  (0.239) 
Year 2000 
-0.98***  -0.85***  -0.90***  -1.58***  -0.89***  -1.25*** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Constant 
-5.11***  -1.04  3.89***  -4.78***  0.11  -1.62 
(0.000)  (0.297)  (0.006)  (0.000)  (0.947)  (0.601) 
Observations  12100  8628  3414  5865  2851  3195 
Individuals  8601  5481  2760  4681  2381  2754 
Average Obs. per Individual  1.407  1.574  1.237  1.253  1.197  1.160 
Rho  0.405  0.304  0.078  0.305  0.232  0.604 
RE Logit Regression. Conditional on activity existence at village level. Longitudinal personal weights used.  
P-values in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
a Reference category: Age Group 15-24 Years,  
b Reference category: Primary education;  
c Reference category: Individuals not working, 
d Reference category: 2nd and 3rd Quantile.  
e Reference category: Central Java. 31 
 
Table 6: Ethnicity and the Effect of Ethnic Polarization in Conflict Areas 
DV: Participation 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Governance  Social Service  Infrastructure  Risk-Sharing  Security  Cooperatives 
Village Characteristics 
Index of Ethnic Polarization 
0.40**  0.49***  0.22  0.72***  0.28  1.17** 
(0.022)  (0.007)  (0.378)  (0.001)  (0.344)  (0.013) 
Conflict Coefficients 
Low Intensity: 1-9 Fatalities 
-0.51***  -0.47***  -0.35***  -0.32***  -0.12  -0.62** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.405)  (0.012) 
High Intensity: ≥ 10 Fatalities 
-0.88***  -0.93***  -0.40  -0.47*  -0.77*  -0.85 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.140)  (0.100)  (0.057)  (0.113) 
IA: Low Intensity x 
High Polarization 
0.33**  0.22  0.29  0.06  -0.32  0.53 
(0.020)  (0.144)  (0.183)  (0.747)  (0.195)  (0.204) 
IA: High Intensity x  
High Polarization 
0.69***  0.65**  0.02  0.65**  0.27  1.96*** 
(0.005)  (0.011)  (0.952)  (0.046)  (0.552)  (0.002) 
RE Logit Regression. Apart from the conflict*high polarization interaction variables, the same control variables as in Table 5 are 
included.  
 
Table 7: Mean Participation Probabilities  
I. LOW ETHNIC POLARIZATION 
Activity 




















34.0  26.5  -7.6  29.8  18.3  -11.5 
(0.46)  (0.41)  (0.06)  (1.30)  (1.01)  (0.35) 
Social Services 
44.4  35.6  -8.8  38.6  23.2  -15.4 
(0.47)  (0.44)  (0.05)  (1.48)  (1.14)  (0.41) 
Infrstructure Development 
75.6  69.6  -6.1  71.0  63.4  -7.7 
(0.52)  (0.58)  (0.07)  (1.72)  (1.86)  (0.19) 
Mutual Insurance 
35.9  31.2  -4.7  20.7  15.5  -5.3 
(0.74)  (0.70)  (0.07)  (1.59)  (1.59)  (0.32) 
Neighborhood Security Group 
66.9  64.9  -2.0  61.9  47.0  -14.9 
(0.97)  (0.98)  (0.02)  (3.35)  (3.27)  (0.50) 
Cooperatives 
9.1  5.8  -3.4  4.7  2.2  -2.5 
(0.48)  (0.36)  (0.13)  (0.56)  (0.29)  (0.27) 
II. HIGH ETHNIC POLARIZATION 
Activity 




















42.2  39.2  -3.0  24.9  22.4  -2.5 
(0.78)  (0.77)  (0.03)  (0.69)  (0.65)  (0.04) 
Social Services 
52.9  48.1  -4.8  31.3  26.5  -4.8 
(0.82)  (0.81)  (0.05)  (0.77)  (0.70)  (0.08) 
Infrstructure Development 
74.0  73.0  -1.0  48.7  40.3  -8.4 
(0.89)  (0.91)  (0.02)  (0.87)  (0.84)  (0.08) 
Mutual Insurance 
54.5  50.3  -4.3  22.9  25.5  2.6 
(1.17)  (1.17)  (0.07)  (0.86)  (0.92)  (0.06) 
Neighborhood Security Group 
76.7  70.2  -6.5  64.0  54.8  -9.3 
(1.02)  (1.14)  (0.15)  (1.63)  (1.69)  (0.16) 
Cooperatives 
15.1  14.2  -0.9  2.1  5.5  3.4 
(1.12)  (1.08)  (0.05)  (0.17)  (0.40)  (0.23) 
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Table 8: Ethnicity and the Impact of Group Participation Rates 
DV: Participation 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Governance  Social Service  Infrastructure  Risk-Sharing  Security  Cooperatives 
Ethnicity Variables 
Population Share of one‟s own Ethnicity 
in the Village 
0.48**  0.35*  0.38  0.54**  0.39  0.36 
(0.012)  (0.070)  (0.111)  (0.027)  (0.199)  (0.499) 
Relative Participation Shares Own vs. 
Other Ethnic Groups  
0.60***  0.15  0.13  0.60**  0.53  4.77*** 
(0.000)  (0.277)  (0.591)  (0.019)  (0.116)  (0.000) 
Index of Ethnic Polarization 
0.37**  0.42**  0.22  0.72**  0.30  0.65 
(0.037)  (0.022)  (0.381)  (0.002)  (0.301)  (0.176) 
Conflict Coefficients 
Low Intensity: 1-9 Fatalities 
-0.50***  -0.49***  -0.35***  -0.33***  -0.12  -0.60** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.422)  (0.015) 
High Intensity: ≥ 10 Fatalities 
-0.89***  -0.91***  -0.41  -0.46  -0.78*  -0.63 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.131)  (0.108)  (0.054)  (0.233) 
IA: Low Intensity x 
High Polarization 
0.32**  0.21  0.29  0.08  -0.30  0.86** 
(0.028)  (0.170)  (0.176)  (0.676)  (0.214)  (0.044) 
IA: High Intensity x  
High Polarization 
0.49*  0.52**  0.00  0.59*  0.24  1.49** 
(0.051)  (0.043)  (0.996)  (0.072)  (0.599)  (0.024) 
IA: Low Intensity x High Polarization x 
Rel. PA Share Own Ethnic Group 
-0.12  0.80*  -0.26  -0.63  -0.21  -2.87 
(0.722)  (0.093)  (0.672)  (0.221)  (0.736)  (0.310) 
IA: High Intensity x High Polarization x 
Rel PA Share Own Ethnic Group 
1.15**  1.89***  1.24  0.39  -2.03  1.88 
(0.030)  (0.003)  (0.118)  (0.661)  (0.235)  (0.492) 
RE Logit Regression. Other than the variable on the relative participation share of the own ethnic group and the conflict interaction 
variables, the same control variables as in Table 5 are included.  
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Table 9: Effects of Other Individual Characteristics in Conflict Areas 
I. HIGHER EDUCATION 
DV: Participation 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Governance  Social Service  Infrastructure  Risk-Sharing  Security  Cooperatives 
Conflict Coefficients 
Low Intensity: 1-9 Fatalities 
-0.49***  -0.44***  -0.25**  -0.38***  -0.25*  -0.64*** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.039)  (0.000)  (0.077)  (0.010) 
High Intensity: ≥ 10 Fatalities 
-0.50***  -0.59***  -0.60***  -0.27  -0.47  -0.25 
(0.001)  (0.000)  (0.004)  (0.184)  (0.115)  (0.528) 
IA: Low Intensity x 
Higher Education 
0.23  0.10  -0.04  0.22  0.07  0.49 
(0.121)  (0.556)  (0.859)  (0.267)  (0.780)  (0.230) 
IA: High Intensity x  
Higher Education 
-0.00  0.04  0.43*  0.63**  -0.08  1.41*** 
(0.989)  (0.866)  (0.098)  (0.020)  (0.834)  (0.006) 
II. LOW ASSETS 
DV: Participation 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Governance  Social Service  Infrastructure  Risk-Sharing  Security  Cooperatives 
Conflict Coefficients 
Low Intensity: 1-9 Fatalities 
-0.45***  -0.50***  -0.30***  -0.33***  -0.27**  -0.50** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.007)  (0.001)  (0.044)  (0.026) 
High Intensity: ≥ 10 Fatalities 
-0.51***  -0.67***  -0.22  0.08  -0.55**  0.48 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.262)  (0.682)  (0.039)  (0.166) 
IA: Low Intensity x 
Low Assets (25
th percent.) 
0.07  0.34**  0.19  0.06  0.16  0.19 
(0.612)  (0.011)  (0.351)  (0.737)  (0.489)  (0.661) 
IA: High Intensity x  
Low Assets  (25
th percent.) 
-0.01  0.39*  -0.73***  -0.37  0.20  -0.54 
(0.966)  (0.091)  (0.007)  (0.195)  (0.614)  (0.353) 
III. HIGH ASSETS 
DV: Participation 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Governance  Social Service  Infrastructure  Risk-Sharing  Security  Cooperatives 
Conflict Coefficients 
Low Intensity: 1-9 Fatalities 
-0.48***  -0.39***  -0.35***  -0.27**  -0.22  -0.52** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.003)  (0.011)  (0.110)  (0.029) 
High Intensity: ≥ 10 Fatalities 
-0.47***  -0.55***  -0.61***  -0.02  -0.23  -0.08 
(0.001)  (0.000)  (0.003)  (0.924)  (0.408)  (0.831) 
IA: Low Intensity x 
High Assets (25
th percent.) 
0.17  -0.13  0.29  -0.18  -0.04  0.15 
(0.174)  (0.330)  (0.121)  (0.323)  (0.864)  (0.680) 
IA: High Intensity x  
High Assets  (25
th percent.) 
-0.09  -0.12  0.53**  -0.02  -0.86**  1.06** 
(0.635)  (0.572)  (0.035)  (0.930)  (0.024)  (0.028) 
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Figure 2: Distribution of Fatal Violence in the Sampleof Districts (1998-1999) 
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Table A1: Alternative Specifications – Conflict and Ethnic Polarization 
I. SUB-SAMPLE: JAKARTA EXCLUDED 
DV: Participation 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Governance  Social Service  Infrastructure  Risk-Sharing  Security  Cooperatives 
Low Intensity: 1-9 Fatalities 
-0.52***  -0.49***  -0.32**  -0.38***  -0.16  -0.72*** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.010)  (0.001)  (0.281)  (0.005) 
High Intensity: ≥ 10 Fatalities 
-0.86***  -0.97***  -0.31  -0.77**  -1.09**  -0.80 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.305)  (0.015)  (0.017)  (0.172) 
IA: Low Intensity x 
High Polarization 
0.32**  0.25  0.23  -0.03  -0.18  0.55 
(0.040)  (0.116)  (0.394)  (0.880)  (0.512)  (0.220) 
IA: High Intensity x  
High Polarization 
0.78**  1.06***  -0.82  1.48***  0.97  2.01** 
(0.012)  (0.001)  (0.118)  (0.001)  (0.111)  (0.013) 
II. SUB-SAMPLE: JAVA ONLY 
DV: Participation 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Governance  Social Service  Infrastructure  Risk-Sharing  Security  Cooperatives 
Low Intensity: 1-9 Fatalities 
-0.53***  -0.55***  -0.40***  -0.28**  -0.07  -0.57** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.025)  (0.661)  (0.028) 
High Intensity: ≥ 10 Fatalities 
-0.98***  -0.95***  -0.45  -0.50*  -0.80*  -0.63 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.107)  (0.092)  (0.055)  (0.248) 
IA: Low Intensity x 
High Polarization 
0.35**  0.39**  0.38  -0.20  -0.61**  -0.23 
(0.030)  (0.024)  (0.104)  (0.354)  (0.029)  (0.627) 
IA: High Intensity x  
High Polarization 
0.73***  0.73***  0.06  0.64*  0.33  1.64** 
(0.003)  (0.005)  (0.856)  (0.058)  (0.482)  (0.012) 
III. 5-FATALITIES THRESHOLD 
DV: Participation 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Governance  Social Service  Infrastructure  Risk-Sharing  Security  Cooperatives 
Low Intensity: 1-4 Fatalities 
-0.56***  -0.46***  -0.33***  -0.38***  -0.22  -0.63** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.009)  (0.001)  (0.146)  (0.012) 
High Intensity: ≥ 5 Fatalities 
-0.45***  -0.75***  -0.46**  -0.24  0.08  -0.94** 
(0.001)  (0.000)  (0.023)  (0.248)  (0.785)  (0.023) 
IA: Low Intensity x 
High Polarization 
0.32**  0.22  0.22  0.05  -0.23  0.43 
(0.029)  (0.161)  (0.323)  (0.786)  (0.354)  (0.305) 
IA: High Intensity x  
High Polarization 
0.38**  0.46**  0.06  0.46*  -0.47  1.77*** 
(0.049)  (0.027)  (0.825)  (0.080)  (0.212)  (0.001) 
IV. CONTINUOUS INDICATOR: NUMBER OF FATALITIES 
DV: Participation 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Governance  Social Service  Infrastructure  Risk-Sharing  Security  Cooperatives 
Number of Fatalities 
-0.02**  -0.02**  -0.04***  0.01  -0.01  0.02 
(0.034)  (0.022)  (0.001)  (0.190)  (0.687)  (0.342) 
Number of Fatalities 
Squared 
0.00  0.00*  0.00***  -0.00  0.00  -0.00 
(0.161)  (0.085)  (0.001)  (0.290)  (0.786)  (0.166) 
Interaction Fatalities and 
Polarization 
0.01*  0.01*  0.01  -0.00  0.00  0.01 
(0.051)  (0.081)  (0.220)  (0.381)  (0.775)  (0.454) 
V. WHOLE SAMPLE (NOT RESTRICTED TO INFORMED INDIVIDUALS) 
DV: Participation 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Governance  Social Service  Infrastructure  Risk-Sharing  Security  Cooperatives 
Low Intensity: 1-9 Fatalities 
-0.56***  -0.46***  -0.33***  -0.38***  -0.22  -0.63** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.009)  (0.001)  (0.146)  (0.012) 
High Intensity: ≥ 10 Fatalities 
-0.45***  -0.75***  -0.46**  -0.24  0.08  -0.94** 
(0.001)  (0.000)  (0.023)  (0.248)  (0.785)  (0.023) 
IA: Low Intensity x 
High Polarization 
0.32**  0.22  0.22  0.05  -0.23  0.43 
(0.029)  (0.161)  (0.323)  (0.786)  (0.354)  (0.305) 
IA: High Intensity x  
High Polarization 
0.38**  0.46**  0.06  0.46*  -0.47  1.77*** 
(0.049)  (0.027)  (0.825)  (0.080)  (0.212)  (0.001) 
VI. ETHNIC FRAGMENTATION  
DV: Participation 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Governance  Social Service  Infrastructure  Risk-Sharing  Security  Cooperatives 
Low Intensity: 1-9 Fatalities 
-0.47***  -0.36***  -0.36**  -0.35**  -0.37*  -0.44 
(0.000)  (0.001)  (0.027)  (0.021)  (0.074)  (0.177) 
High Intensity: ≥ 10 Fatalities 
-0.73***  -0.95***  0.19  -1.08***  -1.84***  -0.67 
(0.001)  (0.000)  (0.608)  (0.008)  (0.005)  (0.323) 
IA: Low Intensity x 
Ethnic HHI >0 
0.07  -0.08  0.09  0.05  0.18  -0.16 
(0.549)  (0.523)  (0.627)  (0.761)  (0.415)  (0.663) 
IA: High Intensity x  
Ethnic HHI >0 
0.34  0.57**  -0.80*  1.29***  1.52**  1.42* 
(0.181)  (0.031)  (0.051)  (0.003)  (0.025)  (0.056) 
Each pair of coefficients from a different regression (control variables as in Table 5).  
P-values in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  36 
 
Table A2: The Effect of Relative Ethnic Participation Shares – All Conflict Areas 
DV: Participation 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Governance  Social Service  Infrastructure  Risk-Sharing  Security  Cooperatives 
Population  Share  of  one‟s  own 
Ethnicity in the Village 
0.47**  0.36*  0.35  0.56**  0.42  0.32 
(0.014)  (0.060)  (0.139)  (0.022)  (0.164)  (0.553) 
Relation Participation Shares Own 
vs. Other Ethnic Groups  
0.67***  0.21  0.03  0.41  0.29  5.41*** 
(0.000)  (0.167)  (0.926)  (0.147)  (0.438)  (0.000) 
Index of Ethnic Polarization 
0.61***  0.65***  0.37*  0.82***  0.12  1.24*** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.079)  (0.000)  (0.607)  (0.003) 
Low Intensity: 1-9 Fatalities 
-0.40***  -0.44***  -0.28**  -0.32***  -0.24*  -0.17 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.010)  (0.001)  (0.054)  (0.469) 
High Intensity: ≥ 10 Fatalities 
-0.73***  -0.59***  -0.51***  -0.04  -0.51**  0.30 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.008)  (0.812)  (0.035)  (0.415) 
IA: Low Intensity x 
Rel. PA Own Ethnic Group 
-0.26  0.07  0.15  0.31  0.47  -3.63 
(0.245)  (0.794)  (0.718)  (0.485)  (0.393)  (0.123) 
IA: High Intensity x  
Rel PA Own Ethnic Group 
1.33***  0.52  1.36*  0.03  -2.01  1.30 
(0.007)  (0.218)  (0.082)  (0.976)  (0.188)  (0.627) 
 
 